The classical models of evolution have been developed to incorporate structured populations using evolutionary graph theory and, more recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for more flexible population structures which potentially change through time and can accommodate multiplayer games with variable group sizes. In this paper we extend this work in three key ways. Firstly by developing a complete set of evolutionary dynamics so that the range of dynamic processes used in classical evolutionary graph theory can be applied. Secondly, by building upon previous models to allow for a general subpopulation structure, where all subpopulation members have a common movement distribution. Subpopulations can have varying levels of stability, represented by the proportion of interactions occurring between subpopulation members; in our representation of the population all subpopulation members are represented by a single vertex. In conjunction with this we extend the important concept of temperature (the temperature of a vertex is the sum of all the weights coming into that vertex; generally, the higher the temperature, the higher the rate of turnover of individuals at a vertex). Finally, we have used these new developments to consider the evolution of cooperation in a class of populations which possess this subpopulation structure using a multiplayer public goods game. We show that cooperation can evolve providing that subpopulations are sufficiently stable, with the smaller the subpopulations the easier it is for cooperation to evolve. We introduce a new concept of temperature, namely "subgroup temperature", which can be used to explain our results.
different spatial structures whilst providing the flexibility for different multi- . There are N individuals who are distributed over M places such that In visits place Pm with probability pnm. Individuals interact with one another when they meet, for example, I 1 and I 2 can interact with one another when they meet in P 1 .
above framework have been limited. In particular only a single evolutionary 50 dynamics (the BDB dynamics from the current paper) has been used, and only 51 relatively simple populations, which resembled those in evolutionary graph the-52 ory (the population consisting of individuals each resident at a unique graph 53 vertex) have been considered.
54
In this paper we further develop the general theory of the framework orig-55 inated in [10] . We first show how to represent subpopulations using a reduced 56 graphical representation within our structure, which will then allow us to po-57 tentially consider larger populations with a richer structure than previously. We 58 then demonstrate how to apply a standard set of evolutionary dynamics to con- Mean fixation probability of a cooperator. W = (w ij ) w ij ∈ (0, ∞)
Weighted adjacency matrix that represents an evolutionary graph. v n Vertex n of an evolutionary graph. In temperature of I j . Q m ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N } Subpopulation of individuals. T Qm = i∈N \Qm j∈Qm w ij Strict subpopulation temperature. independently of the population's history (any past movements), and a version model, which then forms the basis of much of the work in this paper, although 81 we note that Section 3 in particular is more general. Important terms used in 82 the current paper are given in Table 1 .
83 2.1. The population structure 84 We begin by introducing the fully independent model. Consider a population 85 made up of N individuals I 1 , . . . , I N who can move around M places P 1 , . . . , P M .
86
The probability of individual I n being at place P m is denoted by p nm ; see Figure   87 1 for a visual representation using a bi-partite graph. When individuals move 88 around they form groups. Let G denote any group of individuals, then the 89 probability χ(m, G) that group G forms in place P m is given by This follows intuitively from the fact that individual I n has to be present in some 96 place P m in some group G at any given time. The mean size of an individual's 97 group (see also [13] ) is given by
where the simplification of the denominator follows from equation (2.2).
101
When a group of individuals is formed they will then interact with one
102
another. In particular, individual I n will receive a payoff that depends upon is the only type we will consider, and hence will just refer to it as the payoff).
108
Individual I n 's fitness is then calculated by averaging its payoffs over all possible 109 groups and places that these groups can form as follows:
(2.4) home places with an equal probability of 1/(h + d) (see Figure 2 ).
122
I 1 , I 2 I 3 , I 4 I 5 (a)
Figure 3: The generalized territorial raider model. (a) Individuals that are members of subpopulation Qm live in place Pm but can visit neighbouring places. The territory of subpopulation {I 1 , I 2 } consists of places P 1 and P 2 , the territory of subpopulation {I 3 , I 4 } consists of places P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , the territory of subpopulation {I 5 } consists of P 2 and P 3 . (b) An alternative visualization as multiplayer interactions on a bi-partite graph where individuals and places are clearly separated.
We now generalise the territorial raider model to include subpopulations,
123
based upon their movement distributions. We will see that individuals within a
124
given subpopulation are more likely to interact with each other than with mem-125 bers of other subpopulations, and this will affect the success of their strategies.
126
Consider the fully independent model. We define a subpopulation of individ- the reward v is a multiple of the cost. The payoff matrix is thus given by strong support for the evolution of cooperation.
179
In the multiplayer public goods game, the payoffs to cooperators and defec- 
Evolutionary dynamics

193
In this section we revisit the standard dynamics of evolutionary graph theory,
194
before demonstrating how we can adapt each of them to our framework. For 195 the current work there will actually only be two distinct dynamics, but for more 196 general cases each will be distinct, and so it is important to consider them all.
197
We start by recalling the dynamics from evolutionary graph theory. Table 2 . In these definitions, the dynamics are a function of the replacement 225 structure W and the fitnesses of the individuals such that the individual on 226 vertex v n has fitness F n . 
Evolutionary dynamics in our framework
228
In [8] a birth-death dynamics was defined to be used with the territorial 229 raider model. In this section we shall develop a consistent set of dynamics 230 for our framework. In particular, we will show that we can adapt the above 231 dynamics widely used in evolutionary graph theory.
232
To consider the evolution of the population it is useful to think of the in- to these I-vertices as "individuals" but make the distinction where necessary.
240
This leads to a natural way to create evolutionary dynamics for our frame- there is no need to weight χ(m, G) because I i is alone.
259
The replacement weights are therefore calculated as follows 
The definition of strict temperature can be extended to subpopulations to 
327
We note that a strategy introduced in one subpopulation can spread through- 
345
We note that no simulations were run to calculate the fixation probabilities 346 in this paper, rather, all the states of the population were explicitly calculated 347 following the procedure described in the Appendix. 
Thus in what follows, we only mention one dynamics from each pair, in each 367 case the DB dynamics.
368
For DBD dynamics, the defectors do better than cooperators regardless of 369 the population structure. However, for DBB dynamics, cooperators are favoured 370 over defectors for certain population structures. In particular, these structures 371 that favour cooperators contain small subpopulations, ideally of two individuals.
372
We can see this in Figure 4 , where the fixation probability is plotted against cluster of two cooperators is more likely to form when using DBB dynamics.
391
This cluster of cooperators has a fitness larger than that of a cluster of defectors,
392
provided that v > 1, thereby establishing a stronghold against defectors. In fact, In particular, we notice that the fixation probability of the cooperators is decreasing with the mean subpopulation temperature. increasing the value of the reward.
432
To promote cooperation we need a structure involving a subpopulation of : Figure (a) shows the effect of compensating for empty places by increasing the home fidelity such that the probability of staying in their home place, pnn, remains the same. We start at h = 30 for the 33 and 222 structures. As an empty place is added, h is increased so that pnn = 30/31 for the 330,. . . ,330000 structures and pnn = 30/32 for 2220,. . . ,222000 structures. In all cases r = 30 and v = 10. We can see that after compensating for the above effect, the influence of introducing empty places is both reversed and weakened. Figure (b) shows the mean strict subpopulation temperature dropping off when we compensate for the empty places by increasing the home fidelity such that pnn remains the same.
As seen in Figure 4 , increasing the number of empty places that subpopu- be the same, as will the weights for any two members of different subpopulations.
493
Denoting the latter as w O , which will be small, we have w ij = w O when I i and
494
I j are not in the same subpopulation, and
otherwise, with the probability of self-replacement negligible.
496
It follows that only replacements within subpopulations will happen, except 
500
We thus consider a two stage process. Firstly, a new mixed group appears.
501
This occurs rarely, through the invasion of a cooperator into a defector subpop- transition happens with probability
of a cooperator into a defector subpopulation, or we obtain that the ratio of the two expressions in equations (5.1) and (5.2), and 513 thus the relative frequency that the new invasions happen, is thus
for large v and r.
516
The second process considers fixation within a well-mixed group of size L.
517
Following [23] we obtain the formula (cooperator) by a cooperator (defector), when the number of cooperators is k.
522
We have here
(5.6)
526
For sufficiently large r, we obtain
The fixation probability of a single cooperator in a group of defectors is given 531 by ρ C,L = x 1 , and the fixation probability of a single defector in a group of
This implies that cooperators. The probability that the next such event will be the invasion of a 540 subpopulation of defectors by a cooperator is simply fixate within its group with probability ρ C,L , after which, there is a competition between groups proceeding precisely as in a Moran process, so that we have and again consider a combination of theoretical developments and the specific 603 application of the evolution of cooperation. This is our first step in the type of 604 history-dependent analysis described above.
605
We then applied our new methodology to an example, considering the evolu- between this and two individuals whose distributions are completely different.
629
We will investigate this question in later work.
enhances cooperation in ecological prisoner's dilemma game', PLoS One 778 6(11), e27669.
779
[56] Zhou, L., Li, A. and Wang, L. [2015] , 'Evolution of cooperation on com-780 plex networks with synergistic and discounted group interactions', EPL
781
(Europhysics Letters) 110(6), 60006.
782
Appendix A.
783
A state of the population gives the type of each individual in the population.
784
Let S be a state of the population such that n ∈ S if and only if I n is a where P SS is the probability of transitioning from state S to S . The probability with the boundary conditions reversed.
805
The mean fixation probability of cooperators (defectors) is a, potentially, The evolution of the population is essentially described by an absorbing
811
Markov chain. The mean fixation probability is therefore calculated by com- 
